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ABSTRACT. To evaluate critically the policy options available for tackling the 
undeclared economy, this paper commences by evaluating the implications of four 
hypothetical policy choices, namely doing nothing, de-regulating the declared economy, 
eradicating the undeclared economy, or moving undeclared work into the declared 
economy. Finding that a combination of all these is required, a typology of policy 
measures for tackling the declared economy is then outlined. Drawing inspiration 
from the literature on eliciting behavior change in organizations, this identifies that 
the shift from direct controls (deterrents and incentives) to indirect controls (which 
engender a commitment to individual self-governance) can be scaled up to the societal- 
level to elicit behavior change in relation to undeclared work. To shift towards the 
pursuit of individual self-governance as a means of achieving collective self-governance, 
a multi-pronged approach is called for which seeks to change both the codified laws 
and regulations of formal institutions and the norms, values and beliefs that con- 
stitute the informal institutions of a society in order to create symmetry between them. 
The paper concludes by discussing the various ways of combining and sequencing 
direct and indirect controls in a manner that foregrounds the centrality of individual 
self-governance to the achievement of collective self-governance.  
JEL codes: E26; O17 
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1. Introduction 
 
Across the world, many people earn monetary income that they do not declare 
to the state for tax, social security and/or labor law purposes. This undeclared 
work is not some minor phenomenon. According to Schneider et al. (2011), 
such activity represents the equivalent of 13.5 per cent of GDP in high-
income OECD nations, the equivalent of 25.1 per cent of GDP in South Asia, 
27.23 per cent in the Middle East and North Africa, 34.7 per cent in Latin 
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America and the Caribbean and 38.4 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa. In recent 
years, there has been widespread recognition that the problems caused by 
this undeclared economy far outweigh any potential benefits. There has been 
a growing understanding that the undeclared economy not only lowers work 
quality standards and creates risks for the health and safety of workers, but 
also acts as a brake on economic growth, puts at greater risk the financial 
sustainability of social protection systems and undermines the legitimate 
business environment through unfair competition (European Commission, 
2007; Gallin, 2007; Vanderseypen et al., 2013; Williams and Renooy, 2013). 
The result is that greater attention has started to be paid to not only under- 
standing the prevalence of, and reasons for, the undeclared economy, but 
also what needs to be done to tackle this undeclared sphere (Dekker et al., 
2010; Dzhekova and Williams, 2014; Franic and Williams, 2014; Williams, 
2014f; Williams and Renooy, 2013). The aim of this paper is to provide an 
overview and critical evaluation of the policy options and approaches avail- 
able for tackling the undeclared economy. In so doing, the intention is to 
advocate a new approach for tackling the undeclared economy that fore- 
grounds the centrality and importance of individual self-governance to the 
achievement of collective self-governance.  
To commence this critical evaluation of the policy options for tackling the 
undeclared economy, the first section reveals how the problem of tackling 
undeclared work needs re-framing as a wicked problem rather than a tame 
one. The second section then reviews the range of potential hypothetical policy 
choices available for tackling undeclared work. These are: doing nothing; 
de-regulating the declared economy; eradicating the undeclared economy, or 
moving undeclared work into the declared economy. Evaluating these policy 
choices, the finding is that moving undeclared work into the declared eco- 
nomy is the only logical solution, although doing nothing, de-regulating the 
declared economy and eradicating the undeclared economy must remain 
subsidiary strategies in relation to particular population groups and types of 
undeclared work. The third section then draws upon advances in research in 
eliciting behavior change in the workplace in order to develop a heuristic 
conceptual framework for understanding the range of potential measures 
available for tackling the undeclared economy. Highlighting the shift towards 
indirect controls at the organizational level and the possibility for their use at 
the societal level as a means of promoting individual self-governance as a 
means of achieving collective self-governance when tackling undeclared work, 
the fifth section then adopts an institutional approach for understanding how 
such indirect controls can tackle this phenomenon. The sixth section will 
then reveal the different ways in which these indirect controls can combine 
with direct controls before the final section draws conclusions regarding the 
way forward.     
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 Before commencing however, undeclared work needs defining. Although 
in many developing countries, enterprise-based and jobs-based definitions 
have been widely employed (see Williams, 2013a), in developed economies 
activity-based definitions are more common. The most widely used activity-
based definition, and the one adopted in this report, defines the undeclared 
economy as: “all legal production activities that are deliberately concealed 
from public authorities for the following kinds of reasons: to avoid payment 
of income, value added or other taxes; to avoid payment of social security 
contributions; to avoid having to meet certain legal standards such as mini- 
mum wages, maximum hours, safety or health standards, etc.” (OECD, 2002: 
139).  
This definition has been widely adopted in advanced economies (see Baric 
and Williams, 2012; Eurofound, 2013; European Commission, 2007; Schneider 
and Williams, 2013; Williams, 2004a,b, 2007a,b, 2008a,b, 2014a,b,c,d,e; 
Williams and Lansky, 2013; Williams and Nadin, 2012a,b,c, 2014; Williams 
and Renooy, 2013, 2014; Williams and Round, 2008). The only absence from 
undeclared work relative to declared work therefore, is that it is undeclared 
to the authorities for tax, social security and/or labor law purposes. If eco- 
nomic activities possess other absences, then it is not defined as undeclared 
work. If the goods and services are illegal, it is defined as “criminal” activity 
and if unpaid it is defined as part of the “unpaid economy.”  
 
2. Reframing the Undeclared Economy: A Tame or Wicked Problem?  
 
Until now, and similar to many contemporary societal problems, tackling the 
undeclared economy has been beset by a tendency to conceptually frame it 
as what Rittel and Webber (1973) call a “tame” problem, rather than as a 
“wicked” one. A tame problem is one that may be complicated but is easily 
resolvable, often with a discrete response that one can replicate at any time 
and in any context. Conversely, wicked problems are complex, rather than 
complicated, problems and are the outcome of a number of inter-related 
drivers, each of which if addressed has unforeseen and unintentional knock-
on effects (Grint, 2010).  
 A tame problem therefore, may be a complicated problem but is resolv- 
able through uni-linear acts and the problem is likely to have before occurred 
so is a known problem. There is thus limited uncertainty and resolving it 
akin to resolving a puzzle for which there is always an answer. In contrast, a 
wicked problem is more complex, rather than complicated. Indeed, Rittel 
and Webber (1973) identify ten primary characteristics of wicked problems: 
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1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem. 
2. Wicked problems have a no “stopping rule,” that is, no definitive solution, 
no points at which the problem is entirely solved (e.g., undeclared work will 
cease to exist because it has been resolved). 
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad. 
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked 
problem. 
5. Every (attempted) solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation;” 
the results cannot be readily undone, and there is no opportunity to learn by 
trial-and error. 
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively de- 
scribable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well described set of 
permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan. 
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique. 
8. Every wicked problem can be viewed as a symptom of another problem. 
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be 
explained in numerous ways. 
10. The planner has no “right to be wrong” (i.e., there is no public tolerance 
of experiments that fail). 
 
Alternatively but similarly, the Australian Public Service Commission (2007) 
outlines eight key features of wicked problems: 
 
1. Difficult to clearly define. 
2. Many interdependencies and multi-causal aspects. 
3. Proposed measures may have unforeseen effects. 
4. Problems may be unstable and continue evolving. 
5. No clear and correct solution. 
6. Problems are socially complex with many stakeholders. 
7. Responsibility stretches across many organizations. 
8. Solutions may require behavioral changes by citizens and stakeholder 
groups. 
 
The contention in this paper therefore, is that tackling undeclared work is not 
a tame problem but rather, a wicked one. When defining the problem of 
undeclared work, there are multiple drivers which display interdependencies 
and any attempt to tackle these drivers often has unforeseen and unintended 
effects, meaning that there is no clear and correct solution that can be simply 
implemented which necessarily results in the desired outcome. Responsibility 
for tackling the problem moreover, is not confined to one organization but 
rather often stretches across multiple stakeholders and requires profound 
behavioral changes by both citizens as well as stakeholder groups in order to 
address this problem.  
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Wicked problems, in consequence, are tackled using “clumsy” approaches 
rather than “elegant” solutions (Douglas, 1966). Elegant solutions to tame 
problems are internally consistent ways of viewing the world based on partic- 
ular cultural understandings. For hierarchists, stringent rules and punishments 
are used, individualists design incentives and egalitarians cultivate the right 
norms and cultural values. Wicked problems however, do not offer themselves 
up to be solved by such “elegant” approaches. To address wicked problems, 
so-called “clumsy” solutions are required that pragmatically draw from across 
these contradictory framings of the problems and policies.   
 
3. Reviewing the Policy Choices 
 
When tackling the undeclared economy, various hypothetical choices are 
available to policy-makers. Policy-makers might choose to: do nothing; erad- 
icate the undeclared economy; move declared work into the undeclared eco- 
nomy; or alternatively, seek to transfer work from the undeclared economy 
into the declared economy. Although some of these hypothetical choices 
might seem a little implausible at first glance, scholarship on the undeclared 
economy has advocated all of them in recent decades. As such, it is not possible 
to reject any of them without first reviewing and evaluating their implications.    
 
Doing nothing 
A first choice available to policy-makers is to do nothing. Governments could 
choose to ignore the undeclared economy or put another way, to adopt a 
“laissez-faire” approach towards such work. At first glance, it might seem 
obvious that policy makers would wish to tackle the undeclared economy, not 
least to stimulate economic growth, protect working conditions and raise tax 
revenues in a fair and just manner to pay for wider social cohesion measures.  
Nevertheless, there are clear rationales for doing nothing. Firstly, there are 
significant costs associated with government deciding to tackle the undeclared 
economy. Indeed, it might well be that when the undeclared economy is 
relatively small in a country, the revenue-to-cost ratios become so low that it 
is not worthwhile for governments to intervene to reduce its size. Secondly, 
it might be that because the undeclared economy acts as breeding ground for 
enterprise creation and test-bed for many nascent business ventures (Adom, 
2014; Hudson et al., 2012; Williams, 2009b; Williams and Martinez, 2014a,b), 
this sphere should be left alone. Thirdly, in many countries much of the 
undeclared economy is composed of paid favors for close social relations 
(Onoschenko and Williams, 2013; Pfau-Effinger, 2009; Round et al, 2008, 
2010a,b; Vorley and Williams, 2012; Williams and Onoschenko, 2014a,b; 
Williams, 2004a, 2009a), and this is a main vehicle for delivering active 
citizenship. If deterred, governments will destroy precisely the active citizen- 
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ship that it is otherwise seeking to foster. For these reasons, one might choose 
to do nothing about the undeclared economy. The problem however, and as 
Table 1 displays, doing nothing about the undeclared economy also has a wide 
array of costs on declared businesses, undeclared businesses, those working 
in the undeclared economy, customers and governments.  
      Reviewing these costs and benefits, most governments and scholars con- 
clude that the costs of doing nothing outweigh the benefits. Few therefore 
deem doing nothing to be a viable approach. Nevertheless, even if pursuing 
solely this approach is not viable, this is not a reason to reject a laissez-faire 
approach outright. It appears to have some role as part of a package of policy 
approaches. For example, doing nothing might be adopted towards small-scale 
one-off odd-jobs conducted as paid favors to help close social relations, 
which is a primary source of active citizenship in contemporary monetized 
market societies (White and Williams, 2010, 2012; Williams, 2009b), thus 
freeing government resources to concentrate on larger-scale tax evasion by 
businesses. It might also be that doing nothing is appropriate for business 
start-ups, so that they can test-trade the viability of their enterprise (Williams 
and Martinez, 2014a,b,c). In consequence, although doing nothing is not an 
option with regard to all undeclared work, this approach has some role to 
play in relation to specific types of undeclared work. Overall, nevertheless, 
the costs of doing nothing outweigh the benefits, meaning that some form of 
action is required. Three choices exist. 
 
Table 1 Costs and benefits of the undeclared economy   
Costs  Benefits 
For declared businesses:  
Results in unfair competition for declared businesses  Test-bed for business start-ups. 
Declared businesses evade regulatory compliance to compete with 
undeclared businesses resulting in a “race to the bottom”  
 
For undeclared businesses:  
Business expansion hindered by lack of access to the capital and 
business support available to declared businesses  
Enables test-trading of the 
viability of business ventures. 
Pressured into exploitative supply chain relationships with declared 
businesses  
 
Growing a business that cannot be openly advertised is difficult.  
For undeclared workers:  
Lack access to credit and financial services, due to undeclared 
income 
Provides source of income. 
Barriers of entry to formal labor market because unable to 
provide employment history to back up skills 
Reduces barriers to entry into 
work because majority of such 
work is for close social relations. 
No labor rights (e.g., minimum wage, sick pay, redundancy 
rights), access to health and safety standards as well as 
bargaining rights and voice. 
 
Cannot build-up rights to the state pension and other contributory 
benefits, and access occupational pension schemes 
 
For customers:  
Lack legal recourse, insurance cover, guarantees in relation to the 
work undertaken, and certainty that health and safety regulations are 
followed 
A more affordable product or 
service is available to 
customers 
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For governments:  
Causes loss of state revenue in terms of non-payment of direct and 
indirect taxes 
Acts as brake on government 
developing burdensome 
regulations 
Has knock-on effects on attempts to create social cohesion by 
reducing the money governments have at their disposal to pursue 
social integration and mobility 
 
Leads to a loss of regulatory control over the quality of jobs and 
services in the economy 
 
Such activity may encourage a more casual attitude towards the law 
more widely 
 
Source: derived from Williams (2014a: Table 4.1) 
 
De-regulating declared work 
One choice available to governments is to de-regulate declared work. Advocated 
by a neo-liberal approach, this explains the undeclared economy to be a result 
of over-regulation (Becker, 2004; De Soto, 1989, 2001; London and Hart, 
2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Small Business Council, 2004). Viewed through this 
lens, undeclared workers voluntarily exit the declared realm to operate in the 
undeclared economy due to the burdensome regulation in the declared realm 
(e.g., Sauvy, 1984; De Soto, 1989). The undeclared economy, therefore, is 
an expression of the existence of popular resistance to state over-regulation 
and undeclared workers are a political movement. For these scholars therefore, 
the undeclared economy directly results from high taxes, over-regulation and 
state interference in the free market. The resultant policy approach is to pursue 
tax reductions, de-regulation and minimal state intervention.  
Although such scholars praise undeclared workers, their intention is not 
to promote undeclared work. Instead, their view, as Castells and Portes (1989: 
13) put it, is that “In an ideal market economy, with no regulation of any 
kind, the distinction between formal and informal would lose all meaning 
since all activities would be performed in the manner we now call informal.” 
By stripping away regulations, the distinction between declared and undeclared 
work would disappear and the declared and undeclared realms would become 
inseparable since all activities would be undeclared work, although such 
activity would be declared work since it would not be breaking any rules. 
The problems with this policy option are manifold. Firstly, there is little 
evidence that reducing taxes and de-regulating the declared economy reduces 
the size of the undeclared economy. The emerging evidence is that reducing 
taxes does not formalize the economy (Eurofound, 2013; Kus, 2010; Roberts, 
2013; Vanderseypen et al., 2013; Williams, 2013b) and neither does reducing 
the regulatory burden decrease the size of the undeclared economy (Kus, 
2014; Williams and Renooy, 2014). Secondly, even if de-regulation did reduce 
declared work, the outcome would be poorer quality working conditions and 
widening inequalities (Williams, 2006a, 2013b).  
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      Just because pursuing solely this approach is not viable however, does 
not mean that it cannot be part of a package of approaches. De-regulation, 
such as in the form of simplifying compliance, could be a useful tool when 
helping businesses start-up on a legitimate basis. If the regulatory burden is 
high and complex, then de-regulation might have a role to play with regard 
to specific problems facing particular types of undeclared work. On its own 
however, de-regulation is not a viable approach since it would produce a 
leveling down of working conditions.   
 
Eradicating the undeclared economy 
A third choice is to eradicate the undeclared economy. The rationales under- 
pinning this approach are evident in Table 1. Given the problems for declared 
and undeclared businesses, undeclared workers, customers and governments, 
eradicating the undeclared economy appears a viable choice.   
      Yet in recent decades, multifarious problems have been found regarding 
the practicability and desirability of pursuing eradication as an approach. 
The practical problem is that beyond a certain point, the cost of seeking to 
eradicate the remnants of the undeclared economy may well far outweigh the 
benefits of doing so. There is thus a point beyond which it is difficult to 
progress when eradicating the undeclared economy.  
      Examining how its eradication can be achieved moreover, the conven- 
tional approach is to view those working in the undeclared economy as rational 
economic actors who are non-compliant because the pay-off is greater than 
the expected cost of being caught and punished (Allingham and Sandmo, 
1972). As such, policies seek to change the cost/benefit ratio confronting 
actual or likely participants. This is done by focusing on the cost side and 
increasing the perceived or actual likelihood of detection and the penalties for 
those caught (Grabiner, 2000; Richardson and Sawyer, 2001). This therefore, 
is a “negative reinforcement” approach that elicits behavior change by using 
“sticks” to punish “bad” (non-compliant) behavior. In recent years however, 
there have been questions regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of such 
an approach. Many have found that increasing detection and/or penalties 
leads to a growth, rather than decline, in the size of the undeclared economy 
(Bergman and Nevarez, 2006; Murphy, 2005). This is because such an approach 
decreases the willingness to comply by reducing the belief in the fairness of 
the system, especially when the fines are high and/or they are treated in a 
manner which they do not perceive as fair and just (Murphy, 2005).   
      Eradicating undeclared work is also perhaps not desirable. Not only may 
eradication be a costly option for governments but in doing so, governments 
will as mentioned above destroy precisely the entrepreneurial endeavor and 
active citizenship with one hand that with other hands governments are seeking 
to nurture and develop. The consequent challenge confronting governments 
 15 
is to join-up their approach towards the undeclared economy with their wider 
policies towards entrepreneurship and active citizenship. 
      There is also a need to join up the approach towards the undeclared eco- 
nomy with its wider policies on employment creation and social inclusion. 
After all, governments do not seek simply to eradicate the undeclared eco- 
nomy. Rather, eradication is a means to achieving particular ends. One of 
these ends is the growth of the declared economy, such as declared jobs in 
order to improve employment participation rates. Simply eradicating undeclared 
work is not an effective and efficient way of achieving this end. Similarly, if 
an end is to increase government tax revenue, not least to support wider 
societal objectives, then again it is not obvious that eradicating undeclared 
work is appropriate (Sallah and Williams, 2011; Williams, 2014a; Williams 
et al., 2013b).     
      Even if this policy choice is not on its own viable however, as part of a 
package of approaches, it may have a useful supporting and subsidiary role. 
When undeclared workers and businesses have received every opportunity to 
declare their activities but have not done so, then governments must be able 
to detect and punish those failing to comply. In these situations, the tools of 
the eradication approach such as penalties are required. As such, although not 
the cornerstone of any policy approach, it can be a necessary, albeit insuf- 
ficient, part of a policy approach towards undeclared work.  
 
Moving undeclared work into the declared economy 
A fourth and final choice is for governments to move undeclared work into 
the declared economy. The rationales for doing so differ according to whether 
declared and undeclared businesses, undeclared workers, customers or the 
government, are considered. Before reviewing the benefits of such an approach 
however, possible costs need identifying. One cost is that undeclared sup- 
pliers will no longer be able to use the undeclared economy to test-trade their 
business when starting-up, although this issue is not relevant if this approach 
recognizes that many business start-ups are on a journey to formalization and 
it seeks to facilitate this journey. Customers of the undeclared economy, 
meanwhile, will have to pay the full market price, since the function of the 
undeclared economy in providing access to cheaper goods and services will 
no longer be available. The benefits of moving undeclared work into the 
declared economy however, far outweigh these costs.   
      For businesses, moving undeclared work into the declared economy 
eliminates the unfair competitive advantage for undeclared businesses over 
those who play by the rules (Evans et al., 2006; Renooy et al., 2004). It also 
enables businesses to pursue a “high road” rather than “low road” approach 
by moving towards greater regulatory standards on corporate social respon- 
sibility and conditions of work such as health and safety and labor standards 
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(Dibben and Williams, 2012; Grabiner, 2000; Renooy et al., 2004; Williams 
and Windebank, 1998).  
      For businesses operating on an off-the-books basis, the key benefits of 
moving into the declared economy are manifold. They can escape pressuri- 
zation into exploitative relationships with the legitimate sphere (Gallin, 2001; 
Williams and Windebank, 1998) and achieve the same levels of legal protec- 
tion as legitimate businesses (Castells and Portes, 1989; ILO, 2002a; Morris 
and Polese, 2014; Williams and Windebank, 1998). They are also able to 
secure formal intellectual property rights to their products and processes (De 
Beer et al., 2013) and overcome the structural impediments that constrain 
their growth such as by gaining access to capital and secure advice and 
support (ILO, 2002a).  
      Individuals working in the undeclared economy meanwhile, benefit from 
shifting their work into the declared economy. They gain access to health 
and safety standards in the workplace (Adom and Williams, 2014; Evans et 
al., 2006; Gallin, 2001; ILO, 2002a), enjoy the same employment rights as 
declared workers, such as annual and other leave, sickness pay, redundancy 
and training (Evans et al., 2006). They are also able to gain access to mort- 
gages and credit since their pay is official and recognized by lending institu- 
tions (Kempson, 1996; Leonard, 1998; Williams, 2007a). They also benefit 
from greater job security (Williams, 2001), are able to get an employer’s 
reference (ILO, 2002a) and gain access to a range of other legal rights such 
as the minimum wage, tax credits and the working hours directive (Leonard, 
1998; Renooy et al, 2004; Williams and Windebank, 1998). Finally, they can 
build-up rights to the state pension and other contributory benefits, and access 
occupational pension schemes (Gallin, 2001; ILO, 2002b), enjoy bargaining 
rights (ILO, 2002b), improve their employability by being able to evidence 
their engagement in employment, and reduce their constant fear of detection 
and risk of prosecution (Grabiner, 2000).  
      For customers, the advantages of moving work from the undeclared eco- 
nomy into the declared economy are that they benefit from legal recourse if a 
poor job is done, have access to insurance cover, enjoy guarantees in relation 
to the work conducted, and have more certainty that health and safety 
regulations have been followed (Williams and Martinez, 2014c).  
      Finally, for governments, the benefits of moving work from the undeclared 
economy into the declared economy are again manifold. It improves gov- 
ernment revenue, thus enable social integration and mobility to be pursued 
(Williams and Windebank, 1998). It also allows more declared jobs to be 
created and thus improvements in employment participation rates and enables 
a joining-up of the policy approach towards the undeclared economy with 
the policy approaches towards entrepreneurship, active citizenship and social 
inclusion (Dekker et al., 2010; European Commission, 2007, Small Business 
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Council, 2004). It also leads to greater control over the quality of jobs and 
services provided in the economy (Gallin, 2001) and a more positive attitude 
towards the law more widely (Polese, 2014; Renooy et al., 2004; Sasunkevich, 
2014). For these reasons, moving undeclared work into the declared economy 
appears to be the way forward. This is not to say however, that the other 
policy options are entirely redundant.  
 
Towards a mixed approach  
This review of the four choices available reveals that the first option of doing 
nothing is unacceptable. This is because it leaves intact the existing negative 
impacts on legitimate businesses (e.g., unfair competition), undeclared busi- 
nesses (e.g., the inability to gain access to credit to expand), customers (e.g., 
no guarantee of health and safety standards) and governments (e.g., taxes 
owed are not collected). Secondly, de-regulating the declared economy is 
unacceptable because it results in a leveling down rather than up of working 
conditions and third and finally, eradicating the undeclared economy is 
unacceptable because it leads to governments repressing through their approach 
towards the undeclared economy precisely the active citizenship, enterprise 
culture and social inclusion that they otherwise wish to nurture. Moving 
undeclared work into the declared economy thus appears to be the most 
viable policy choice. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the other choices 
do not have a role to play.    
      Although moving undeclared work into the declared economy is the most 
viable choice, it may be that doing nothing may sometimes have a support- 
ing role to play such as in relation to small-scale paid favors because such 
activity is not susceptible to conversion into declared employment. A de-
regulatory approach, meanwhile, may be in some instances useful when 
seeking to simplify compliance in relation to business start-ups and an eradi- 
cation approach when tackling those who fail to comply.   
 
4. Policy Measures: A Heuristic Conceptual Framework 
 
In the last section, the argument was that transferring undeclared work into 
the declared economy is the most beneficial policy approach for the widest 
range of actors affected by the undeclared economy, although the approaches 
of doing nothing, de-regulating the declared economy and eradicating the 
undeclared economy all have subsidiary roles to play. Based on this, the aim 
of this section is to provide a conceptual framework of the policy measures 
available for tackling the undeclared economy.  
      The starting point is the recognition that eliciting behavior change at a 
societal level in order to tackle the undeclared economy is a relatively new 
subject area that can perhaps learn much from more established academic 
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disciplines, such as human resource management (HRM) and organizational 
behavior, which have been promoting behavior change at the organizational 
level for many decades. Here, therefore, the advances at the organizational 
level in eliciting behavior change reveal a shift from the use of direct con- 
trols to indirect controls. Shifting the scale of analysis from the organizational 
to the societal-level, a conceptual framework is then developed of the range 
of direct and indirect controls available to governments when tackling the 
undeclared economy.   
 
Direct and indirect controls: lessons from the organizational level 
At the organizational level, there has been a long-standing shift away from 
the use of direct controls and towards the use of indirect controls when seek- 
ing to elicit behavior change in the workforce. This is variously referred to 
as a shift from “hard” to “soft” human resource management or “bureau- 
cratic” to “post-bureaucratic” management (Grey, 2005; Legge, 1995; Reed, 
1992, 2005; Thompson and Alvesson, 2005). Here, this paradigmatic shift is 
reviewed of how behavior change is being elicited at the organizational level 
in order to consider what might happen if this was scaled-up to, and applied 
at, the societal level to create “high commitment” societies.   
      To understand the direct controls approach (alternatively termed “hard” 
HRM or bureaucratic management) and its successor, the indirect controls 
approach (“soft” HRM or post-bureaucratic management), Table 2 provides 
a useful summary of the two approaches. This reveals that conventional 
bureaucratic work organizations when seeking to elicit behavior change 
amongst the workforce focus upon direct controls or compliance via close 
supervision and monitoring, tight rules, prescribed procedures and centralized 
structures within the context of a low commitment, low trust and adversarial 
culture. Post-bureaucratic organizations, meanwhile, emphasize the use of in- 
direct control methods through loose rules, flexible procedures and decentralized 
structures in the context of a high commitment, high trust culture of mutual 
interest.  
 
Table 2 Direct and indirect control approaches in work organizations 
Direct control approaches Indirect control approaches 
Close supervision and monitoring of activities Empowerment and discretion applied to activities 
Tight rules Loose rules 
Highly prescribed procedures Flexible procedures 
Centralized structures Decentralized structures 
Low commitment culture High commitment culture 
Low trust culture High trust culture 
Adversarial culture Culture of mutual interest 
A tightly bureaucratic structure and culture A loosely bureaucratic structure and culture 
Source: derived from Watson (2003: Table 5.2) 
 
In the indirect controls approach in contrast, there is a shift from externalized 
to internalized control by seeking to align the values of the workforce with 
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the values of the organization, rather than seeking rule following. In conse- 
quence, while the direct controls approach conventionally sought compliance 
using externally imposed bureaucratic control systems, generating reactive 
rather than proactive behaviors, the indirect controls approach seeks commit- 
ment through internalized belief, generating constructive pro-activity on the 
part of people (e.g., Guest, 1987; Legge, 1989, 1995). As Watson (2003: 109) 
states, “the single feature that distinguishes [this approach] ... is its concern 
with developing a high level of psychological and social commitment towards 
the employing organization.” This indirect controls approach is therefore con- 
cerned with instilling emotions, values and world-views that are congruent 
with the interests of the organization so as to generate internal control from 
both the individual themselves and the team of people surrounding them 
(Wilkinson and Willmott, 1994).  
      Until now, this turn towards an indirect controls approach when eliciting 
behavior change has been largely at the organizational level. Here however, 
attention turns to applying the same approach to the societal level and more 
specifically, tackling the undeclared economy. 
 
Tackling undeclared work: direct and indirect control approaches 
Examining the literature on tackling undeclared work, there are two contrast- 
ing policy approaches. Firstly, there is a dominant direct controls approach, 
which detects and punishes non-compliance and/or provides rewards for those 
engaging in compliant behavior. Secondly, there is an indirect controls ap- 
proach. This fosters internalized control in order to nurture commitment to 
acting in a compliant behavior. These have been variously labeled a “chau- 
vinistic” versus “softy” approach (Cullis and Lewis, 1997), “regulatory 
formalism” versus “responsive regulation” (Braithwaite, 2002), “deterrence” 
versus “tax morale” (Ahmed and Braithwaite, 2005) and “command and 
control” versus “responsive regulation” (Commonwealth Association of Tax 
Administrators, 2006).   
 Figure 1 provides a conceptual framework for understanding these direct 
and indirect control approaches when tackling undeclared work. In the direct 
controls approach, the intention is to seek compliant behavior by ensuring that 
benefits of operating in the declared economy outweigh the costs of working 
in the undeclared economy. This is accomplished either by using deterrence 
measures to increase the costs of non-compliance (“sticks”) and/or by making 
the conduct of declared work more beneficial and easier (“carrots”). In the 
indirect controls approach meanwhile, attention shifts away from using “sticks” 
and “carrots” to elicit behavior change and instead focuses on developing the 
psychological contract (or what might also be called the social contract) 
between the state and its citizens by fostering a high trust high commitment 
culture. Here therefore, each of these approaches is reviewed in turn.  
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Figure 1 A typology of policy measures for tackling undeclared work  
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Direct controls 
The use of direct controls is the conventional policy approach adopted for 
tackling the undeclared economy. As the OECD (2008: 82) put it, “Com- 
bating informal employment requires a comprehensive approach to reduce 
the costs and increase the benefits to business and workers of operating 
formally.” To outline this direct controls approach therefore, firstly, the use 
of deterrence measures to detect and punish non-compliant (“bad”) behavior 
is reviewed followed secondly, the use of incentives to make it easier to 
undertake, and reward, compliant (“good”) behavior. 
 
Direct controls: deterrence measures 
The origins of the deterrence approach to elicit behavior change lies in the 
work of Jeremy Bentham (Bentham, 1788) and Cesare Beccaria (Beccaria, 
1797) on the classic utilitarian theory of crime. The premise is that people are 
rational actors who behave in a manner to maximize their expected utility. In 
other words, they disobey the law if the expected penalty and probability of 
detection is small relative to the profits gained. Based on this premise, gov- 
ernments must seek to deter these supposedly rational economic actors by 
making the benefits of non-compliance smaller than the benefits of compliance. 
 In criminological studies, this rational actor approach was subsequently 
popularized by Becker (1968) who argued that governments must find the 
appropriate balance between the costs of non-compliance and the benefits of 
compliance to make compliance the rational choice for people. According to 
him, by increasing the probability of detection and the sanctions, non-
compliance becomes irrational behavior. Prior to this rational economic 
actor approach, the dominant view was that criminal behavior resulted from 
mental illness and/or the social environment, and that criminals are simply 
victims of their circumstances. Becker’s work thus signaled a paradigm shift.   
During the early 1970s, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) applied this Beck- 
erian economics of crime approach to the study of tax non-compliance to 
bring about a similar paradigmatic shift. In a seminal paper, they argued that 
the non-compliant are rational economic actors who evade tax when the pay-
off is greater than the expected cost of detection and punishment. To deter 
engagement therefore, the goal is to change the cost/benefit ratio facing those 
participating or considering participation in non-compliance (e.g., Bernasconi, 
1998; Grabiner, 2000; Gramsick and Bursik, 1990; Hasseldine and Li, 1999; 
Job et al., 2007; Lewis, 1982, Milliron and Toy, 1988; Rani et al., 2013; 
Richardson and Sawyer, 2001; Sandford, 1999). In this deterrence approach, 
this was achieved by focusing on the cost side of the equation and increasing 
the actual and perceived risks and costs associated with participation by 
firstly, raising the perceived or actual likelihood of detection and/or secondly, 
raising the penalties and sanctions for those caught.  
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This, therefore, is a “negative reinforcement” approach; it seeks behavior 
change by using “sticks” that punish non-compliant (“bad”) behavior. In many 
other spheres however, punishing people for doing something wrong (i.e., 
negative reinforcement) is recognized as relatively ineffective at changing 
behavior in the ways desired compared with rewarding good behavior (i.e., 
positive reinforcement). Indeed, few parents today would believe that smack- 
ing their children for doing something wrong is the best way to change their 
behavior. Instead, rewarding good behavior is seen as more effective. Despite 
this, when it comes to tackling the undeclared economy, this same recognition 
does not appear to exist, at least so far as those adopting the dominant 
deterrence approach is concerned.   
A substantial and growing body of literature on the use of deterrents to 
tackle the undeclared economy nevertheless, is not supportive of the effective- 
ness of this deterrence approach (see Williams, 2008a,b, 2014a; Williams et 
al., 2013c). A growing body of literature for example, reveals that increasing 
penalties either leads to a growth in undeclared work, has no effect, or only a 
short-term effect, on compliance (Elffers et al., 1987; Feld and Frey, 2002; 
Friedland, 1982; Murphy, 2005; Spicer and Lunstedt, 1976; Varma and Doob, 
1998; Webley and Halstead, 1986). There is also a large body of evidence that 
increasing the probability of detection does not lead to greater compliance 
(e.g., Dubin et al., 1997; Dubin and Wilde, 1988; Elffers et al., 1987; Shaw 
et al., 2008; Webley and Halstead, 1986). Instead, it increases non-compliance, 
not least due to a breakdown of trust between the state and its citizens (Ayres 
and Braithwaite, 1992; Blumenthal et al., 1998; Brehm and Brehm, 1981; 
Kagan Scholz, 1984; Murphy and Harris, 2007; Tyler et al., 2007; Williams, 
2001). Indeed, the most telling rebuttal of deterrents is the finding that many 
voluntarily comply even when the level of penalties and risks of detection 
would suggest that they should act in a non-compliant manner if they were 
truly rational economic actors (Baldry, 1986; Erard and Feinstein, 1994; 
Murphy, 2008). Obviously therefore, other factors must be at work engender- 
ing this commitment to compliant behavior that lie beyond the level of 
deterrents. 
This deterrence approach has not only been criticized due to questions 
being raised about its effectiveness but a range of unintended and unwanted 
broader impacts of using deterrence measures have also been identified. As 
highlighted above, the outcome of a deterrence approach is that one hand of 
government suppresses precisely the enterprise culture and active citizenship 
that other hands of government wish to foster. When this is combined with 
the recognition that punishing non-compliant (“bad”) actions is not neces- 
sarily the most effective means of changing behaviour, the outcome has been 
that many have begun to question the value of this approach. New approaches 
have thus emerged.   
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Direct controls: incentive measures 
When using direct controls, the deterrence approach focuses upon increasing 
the costs of operating in the undeclared economy. With the growing recog- 
nition across governments that the goal is to move undeclared work into the 
declared economy however, a shift has begun to take place. Rather than 
detect and punish non-compliance, there has been a shift towards incen- 
tivizing declared work by making it easier and more beneficial to engage in 
declared work (Renooy et al., 2004; Small Business Council, 2004; Slemrod, 
1992; Williams, 2006a).   
Unlike the deterrence approach which uses negative reinforcement by 
punishing “bad” (non-compliant) behavior, this approach uses positive rein- 
forcement by rewarding “good” (compliant) behavior, rather than taking it as 
given. This recognizes that compared with rewarding good behavior, punish- 
ing bad behavior is relatively ineffective. Indeed, evidence of this is found in 
studies ranging from effective leadership in organizations (e.g., Prewitt, 2003; 
Romero and Kleiner, 2000), toilet training young children (Cicero and Pfadt, 
2002), smoking cessation (Glautier, 2004), the personal management of dia- 
betes (e.g., Parra-Medina et al., 2004) and tackling anti-social behavior in 
schools (Beaman and Wheldall, 2000; Luiselli et al., 2002). In these and many 
other fields, it is now rare to find an emphasis on negative reinforcement 
when changing behavior.  
When tackling the undeclared economy, this positive reinforcement ap- 
proach can take at least three forms, as displayed in Figure 1 above. Firstly, 
it can be made easier and/or more beneficial for businesses to engage in 
compliant behavior. Secondly, it can be made easier and/or more beneficial 
for individuals supplying undeclared work to engage in compliant behavior. 
Third and finally, it can be made easier and/or more beneficial for customers 
to use the declared rather than the undeclared economy to source goods and 
services.  
 
Indirect controls 
The problem with changing behavior using direct controls to alter the cost/ 
benefit ratio confronting businesses and people is that these actors are not 
always rational economic actors with perfect information available. They are 
limited in their ability to compute the costs and benefits, often misperceive 
or do not perceive the real costs of their actions, have limited self-control 
and are influenced by social context. Most importantly, they are not just 
motivated by self-interest and what is most profitable for them but by addi- 
tional motives, including redistribution, fairness, reciprocity, social customs, 
norms and morality (Alm, 2011).  
      Based on this recognition, the indirect controls approach moves away 
from the use of “sticks” and “carrots” to change behavior. Instead, the focus 
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is on the use of indirect controls that improve the psychological contract 
between the state and its citizens in order to nurture a high trust high com- 
mitment culture (Alm et al., 1995; Andreoni et al., 1998; Torgler, 2003; 
Weigel et al., 1987; Wenzel, 2002). The intention is to engender willing or 
voluntary commitment to compliant behavior rather than force citizens to 
comply using threats, harassment and/or incentives (see for example, Kirchler, 
2007; Torgler, 2007, 2011).  
To understand the tools used in this approach, it is necessary to recognize 
that there exists an institutional incongruity between the laws, codes and 
regulations of formal institutions and the norms, beliefs and values of in- 
formal institutions. Work in the undeclared economy occurs where the norms, 
values and beliefs differ to the laws and regulations, resulting in what formal 
institutions deem to be illegal activities being legitimate in terms of the 
norms, values and beliefs of the society or particular population groups. To 
tackle the undeclared economy therefore, there is a need to reduce this insti- 
tutional incongruence. This can be achieved either by changing the informal 
institutions and/or the formal institutions.  
On the one hand, therefore, policy can seek to change the norms, values 
and beliefs of the population regarding the acceptability of working in the 
undeclared economy so that these informal institutions align with the laws, 
regulations and codes of formal institutions. This commitment approach views 
individuals and businesses not as rational economic actors but as social actors 
ordinarily inclined to comply with the law because of their belief in the rule 
of law and understanding that it is in their self-interest (Kagan and Scholz, 
1984; Murphy, 2008). As such, their cooperation rather than coercion is 
pursued by changing their attitudes towards compliance. This is achieved 
using awareness raising campaigns about the costs of undeclared work and 
benefits of declared work, tax education campaigns and normative appeals.  
On the other hand, policy can also seek to change the formal institutions 
to align with the norms, values and beliefs of society. Two options exist in 
this regard. Firstly, this can involve internal process changes in the formal 
institutions to improve the perception that there is tax fairness, procedural 
justice and redistributive justice. Fairness here refers to the extent to which 
people believe they are paying their fair share compared with others (Wenzel, 
2004a). Redistributive justice refers to whether they receive the goods and 
services they believe that they deserve given the taxes that they pay (Richard- 
son and Sawyer, 2001) and procedural justice to the degree to which they 
believe that the tax authority has treated then in a respectful, impartial and 
responsible manner (Braithwaite and Reinhart, 2000; Murphy, 2005).  
Secondly, this can involve changing the products of formal institutions 
by pursuing wider economic and social developments. For the moment, the 
economic and social developments required to reduce the undeclared economy 
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are left aside. Here, all that is necessary is to recognize that using indirect 
controls to engender a greater commitment of citizens to compliance requires 
changes in both formal and informal institutions to reduce institutional 
incongruence. If pursued, a reduction in the undeclared economy can result 
through a shift towards greater self-regulation brought about by an intrinsic 
psychological and social commitment to the value of the declared economy. 
Below, therefore, how this can be achieved is outlined.  
 
5. An Institutional Perspective on the Way Forward  
 
To advance understanding of how this indirect controls approach can tackle 
undeclared work, this section provides an institutional perspective on the 
way forward. In many societies, that is, the laws, codes and regulations of 
the formal institutions are incongruent with the norms, beliefs and values 
that comprise the informal institutions. To tackle undeclared work therefore, 
a reduction in this institutional incongruence is required. Two options exist. 
On the one hand, one can seek to change the norms, values and beliefs of the 
population regarding the acceptability of working in the undeclared economy 
so that these informal institutions align with the laws, regulations and codes 
of formal institutions. On the other hand, one can change the formal institu- 
tions to align with the norms, values and beliefs of the wider society.  
The aim of this section is to review and evaluate how to achieve this so 
that there is an intrinsic psychological and social commitment to the value of 
the declared economy and thus a reduction in undeclared work. Firstly, 
therefore, this section will evaluate the varying degree to which formal and 
informal institutions align across European societies. Secondly, policy mea- 
sures that seek to change the norms, values and beliefs of the population so 
that these informal institutions align with the laws, regulations and codes of 
formal institutions, are outlined. This will include a review of tax education 
initiatives, awareness raising campaigns and normative appeals that seek to 
improve the level of tax morality. Thirdly, policy measures are reviewed that 
seek to change the formal institutions so that they align more with the norms, 
values and beliefs of the wider society. On the one hand, this involves process 
changes in formal institutions. These include improving procedural justice 
(i.e., whether citizens believe the authorities are treating them in a respectful, 
impartial and responsible manner), procedural fairness (i.e., whether citizens 
believe they are paying their fair share compared with others) and redis- 
tributive justice (i.e., whether citizens believe they are receiving the goods 
and services they deserve given the taxes they pay). On the other hand, this 
includes changes in the products of formal institutions by pursuing wider 
economic and social developments. The outcome will be a fuller understand- 
ing of the measures available in the indirect controls approach. 
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The asymmetry of formal and informal institutions  
All societies have codified laws and regulations that define the legal rules of 
the game (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; North, 1990; Webb et al., 2013, 2014; 
Williams and Vorley, 2014). Informal institutions meanwhile, are the norms, 
values and beliefs that shape what is socially acceptable (North, 1990, Webb 
et al., 2013, 2014). When formal and informal institutions are unaligned, one 
finds the existence of economic activities not aligned with the laws and 
regulations of formal institutions but that are within the boundaries of what 
informal institutions deem acceptable (De Castro et al., 2014; London et al., 
2014; Webb et al., 2009, 2013, 2014). An exemplar is undeclared work which 
is “illegal” in the eyes of formal institutions but often seen as “legitimate” 
from the viewpoint of the norms, values and beliefs comprising a society’s 
informal institutions. The level of tax morale measures this gap between 
formal and informal institutions. When the discrepancy is large, tax morale 
is low. When the formal and informal institutions closely align meanwhile, 
tax morale is high.  
 Tax morality refers to a person’s internal or intrinsic motivation to pay 
taxes owed (McKerchar et al., 2013; Torgler, 2005a, 2007, 2012; Torgler and 
Schneider, 2007) and studies reveal a strong correlation between the propen- 
sity to engage in undeclared work and the level of tax morality (Alm et al., 
1995; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Richardson, 2006). What, therefore, is the current 
level of institutional incongruence between formal and informal institutions 
so far as paying taxes are concerned. To measure this, the current level of tax 
morality across Europe can be evaluated using data from the 2013 Euro- 
barometer survey (European Commission, 2014). In this survey, participants 
were asked to rate how acceptable they felt various behaviors relating to tax 
non-compliance were, using a 10-point scale where 1 means “absolutely un- 
acceptable” and 10 means “absolutely acceptable.” The six behaviors examined 
were: 
 Someone receives welfare payments without entitlement; 
 A firm is hired by another firm and does not report earnings; 
 A firm hires a private person and all or part of their salary is not declared; 
 A firm is hired by a household and doesn’t report earnings; 
 Someone evades taxes by not or only partially declaring income; and 
 A person hired by a household does not declare earnings when it should 
be declared. 
 
To analyze the level of tax morality and thus institutional incongruence on 
paying taxes, the 10-point scale is condensed into three groups: a respondent 
rating of 1–4 is deemed “unacceptable;” a rating of 5–6 as “fairly accept- 
able” and a rating of 7–10 classified as “acceptable.” Figure 2 reports the 
aggregate findings across all six behaviors in terms of the share of the 
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population who deem participation in these forms of undeclared work to be 
“unacceptable.”  
As Figure 2 reveals, strong cross-national variations exist in the level of 
tax morality and thus the level of institutional incongruence between formal 
and informal institutions. Examining firstly the countries where there is the 
greatest symmetry between formal and informal institutions in terms of the 
willingness to pay taxes owed, the finding is that participants in Cyprus are 
the least tolerant of the undeclared economy among the 28 countries, followed 
by two Nordic countries (Finland and Sweden) and two Southern European 
nations (Greece and Malta). The countries most tolerant of undeclared work 
meanwhile, and where the greatest institutional incongruence exists between 
formal and informal institutions, are East-Central European nations, with 
participants in Latvia the most likely to view the undeclared economy as 
acceptable, followed by Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and 
Estonia. The remaining countries, including all Western European countries, 
fall between these two extremes. 
Given this assessment of the size of the gap between the formal and in- 
formal institutions regarding tax non-compliance, attention now turns towards 
the various policy measures that can reduce this institutional asymmetry.  
Source: derived from Williams (2014a: Table 10.2) 
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Changing the informal institutions     
To tackle undeclared work, one option is to change the norms, values and 
beliefs of informal institutions to align better with the codified laws and regu- 
lations of formal institutions. To achieve this, firstly, one can seek to improve 
tax knowledge, secondly, pursue awareness-raising campaigns and third and 
finally, normative appeals.  
 
Improving tax knowledge 
Educating citizens about taxation is important if the norms, values and beliefs 
are to align with the codified laws and regulations of formal institutions. To 
do this, two types of education are required. Firstly, there is the need to 
educate citizens about what the current tax system requires of them by 
providing easily consumable information on their responsibilities. Secondly, 
and more widely, there is the need to educate citizens about the value and 
benefits of paying taxes in order to elicit an intrinsic motivation to comply.   
The first type of education thus requires easily consumable knowledge on 
the current tax system so that citizens understand their responsibilities. A 
large body of research is critical of the complexity of tax systems and the 
problems this poses for achieving high rates of compliance (Andreoni et al., 
1998; Natrah, 2013; Tanzi and Shome, 1994). A significant portion of supposed 
tax evasion is unintentional, resulting from lack of knowledge, misunder- 
standing and ambiguous interpretation of tax law (Hasseldine and Li, 1999; 
Natrah, 2013). One way forward therefore, is to provide greater information 
to taxpayers (Internal Revenue Service, 2007; Vossler et al., 2011).  
 The second type of education more broadly educates citizens about the 
value and benefits of paying their taxes. In many countries for example, sub- 
stantial voluntary donations to private charities occur but at the same time, 
citizens are reticent about paying their taxes, despite private charities often 
having parallel missions to government. This is doubtless because they know 
what happens to voluntary donations given to private charities but not what 
happens to their taxes (Li et al., 2011). A way forward therefore, is to educate 
citizens about what happens to their taxes. This can be done by informing 
citizens of the current and potential public goods and services received (Bird 
et al., 2006; Saeed and Shah, 2011). Signs such as “your taxes are paying for 
this,” for example on public construction projects (e.g., new roads), are one 
way of doing this by conveying a clear message to the public that money 
collected is paying for public goods and services. 
 
Awareness-raising campaigns 
A further tactic to change attitudes towards the undeclared economy and to 
nurture commitment to tax morality is to run awareness-raising campaigns. 
Such campaigns can either inform: undeclared workers of the costs and risks 
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of undeclared work; potential users of undeclared labor of the risks and costs; 
undeclared workers of the benefits of being declared, and/or potential users 
of undeclared work of the benefits of declared labor. 
 Indeed, the evidence suggests that advertising campaigns are effective 
and cost efficient. In the UK for example, an evaluation of the advertising 
campaigns run by HMRC reveals that some 8300 additional people had 
registered to pay tax who would otherwise not have done so who will pay 
tax of around £38 million over three years, providing a return of 19:1 on the 
expenditure of £2 million. This compares with an overall return of 4.5: 1 on 
the £41 million a year spent on all its undeclared economy work in 2006–07 
(National Audit Office, 2008).   
 
Use of normative appeals 
Normative appeals to citizens to declare their undeclared activities are another 
potential way forward. Their effectiveness however, depends in part on the 
nature of the appeal made. Although Blumenthal et al. (2001) in Minnesota 
reveal that normative appeals only affected some groups of taxpayer, Chung 
and Trivedi (2003) examine the impact of normative appeals on a friendly 
persuasion group who were required to both generate and read a list of 
reasons why they should comply fully and compared with a control group 
not asked to do so. The participants in the friendly persuasion groups report 
higher earnings than the control group. Hasseldine et al. (2007), meanwhile, 
examine 7,300 sole proprietors in the UK. Comparing the effect of five 
different letters from a simple offer of assistance to a letter advising that 
his/her tax return had been already pre-selected for audit, they find that 
appeals resulted in greater compliance.   
 
Changing the formal institutions       
Besides changing the norms, values and beliefs in order to synchronize 
formal and informal institutions, another option is to change the formal 
institutions. On the one hand, this involves pursuing process changes. On the 
other hand, this can involve changing the products of formal institutions by 
pursuing wider economic and social developments.  
 
Changing processes within formal institutions 
Changing the processes within formal institutions to create greater symmetry 
with informal institutions requires at least three changes. Firstly, procedural 
justice can be improved which refers to the degree to which citizens believe 
that the tax authority has treated then in a respectful, impartial and respon- 
sible manner (Braithwaite and Reinhart, 2000, Murphy, 2005; Taylor, 2005; 
Tyler, 1997, Wenzel, 2002). Secondly, procedural fairness can be enhanced 
which is the extent to which people believe they are paying their fair share 
compared with others (Kinsey and Gramsick, 1993; Wenzel, 2004a,b). Third 
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and finally, redistributive justice can be improved which refers to whether 
citizens receive the goods and services they believe that they deserve given 
the taxes that they pay (Kinsey and Gramsick, 1993; Kinsey et al., 1991; 
Richardson and Sawyer, 2001; Thurman et al., 1984). Here, a review of each 
policy measure is undertaken.  
 
Procedural justice  
The extent to which citizens perceive the government to have treated them in 
a respectful, impartial and responsible manner has a significant effect on 
compliance. If they view the tax administration as treating them in such a 
manner, then they will be more likely to engage in compliant behavior 
(Hanousek and Palda, 2003; Hartner et al, 2008; Murphy, 2003; Murphy et 
al., 2009; Torgler and Schneider, 2007; Wenzel, 2002). Leventhal (1980) 
formulated the following six rules regarding procedural justice:  
(i) the consistency rule means that procedures should be consistent across 
people and time; nobody should be favored or disadvantaged;  
(ii) bias suppression rule points out that egoistic intentions and prejudice on 
the part of the decision-makers should be avoided; 
(iii) accuracy rule says that all relevant sources of information should be 
exhausted, in order that decisions are based on well-founded information; 
(iv) correctability rule refers to the possibility of the adjustment or revision 
from decisions made; 
(v) representativeness rule means that the opinions and interests of all parties 
should be considered, and  
(vi) ethicality rule emphasizes that procedures should be in accord with the 
prevailing moral and ethical values. 
 
Leventhal’s rules deal primarily with the decision-making process. However, 
Bies and Moag (1986) emphasize the importance of additionally considering 
interpersonal interactions. People want respectful and fair treatment (i.e., 
interactional fairness). As Wenzel (2006) finds, the compliance rate was sig- 
nificantly higher among taxpayers who perceived there to be interactional 
fairness. Being treated politely, with dignity and respect, being given a say, 
and having genuine respect shown for one rights and social status all enhance 
compliant behavior (Alm et al., 1993; Feld and Frey, 2002; Gangl et al., 
2013; Hartner et al., 2008; Murphy 2005; Tyler, 1997, 2006; Wenzel, 2002).  
 
Procedural fairness  
This refers to the extent to which people believe they are paying their fair 
share compared with others (Wenzel, 2004a,b). People who receive proce- 
durally fair treatment by an organization will be more likely to trust that 
organization and will be more inclined to accept its decisions and follow its 
directions (Murphy, 2005). The fairness of the tax system is one of the most 
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important determinants of tax morale (Bobeck and Hatfield, 2003; Hartner et 
al., 2007, 2011; Kirchgässner, 2010, 2011; McGee, 2005, 2008; McGee et 
al., 2008; Molero and Pujol, 2012). Conversely, where there is grievance by 
citizens that they are not receiving fair treatment, non-compliance increases 
(Bird et al., 2006).  
 
Redistributive justice  
This refers to whether citizens receive the goods and services they believe that 
they deserve given the taxes that they pay (Richardson and Sawyer, 2001). 
Taxes are prices for the goods and services provided by the government. The 
question for the moral evaluation of taxes is whether the price corresponds to 
the value of these services (i.e., whether it is seen as “just”), namely whether 
there is a “just price” (Kirchgässner, 2010). Citizens see themselves as more 
justified being non-compliant and breaking the psychological contract between 
the state and its citizens, the less they perceive the tax system as fair. If tax 
compliance is to be high therefore, the tax system should be perceived as fair.  
 If citizens view their interests as properly represented in formal institu- 
tions and they receive what they view as appropriate public goods and services 
for the taxes they pay, their identification with the state increases and their 
willingness to contribute is greater. If however, citizens do not receive the 
goods and services that they believe they deserve given the taxes that they 
pay, then non-compliance increases (McGee, 2005). This may occur for 
example, when corruption is rampant and the citizen has little trust in formal 
institutions. In such situations, there will be a low incentive to cooperate. 
Corruption generally undermines the tax morale of the citizens, causing them 
to become frustrated. Taxpayers will feel cheated if they believe that corrup- 
tion is widespread and their tax burden is not spent well (McGee, 2005; 
Torgler, 2007, 2012; Uslaner, 2007). As Kirchgässner (2010: 28) thus put it, 
“If the willingness to pay taxes is to be enforced, a responsible use of tax 
revenue by the public authorities is necessary as well as a partnership relation 
(and not a magisterial one) between them.” The result is that governments 
need to educate citizens about where their taxes are spent. In situations 
where citizens do not know, or do not fully understand that public goods and 
services are due to taxes, then compliance will be lower than in situations 
where citizens are fully aware of the public goods and services they receive 
for their taxes and agree with how their taxes are spent (Lillemets, 2009). In 
recent years therefore, many governments have sought to explain to tax- 
payers how their money is spent.   
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Changing the products of formal institutions:  
wider economic and social developments 
To achieve a high-commitment culture and self-regulation by citizens, there 
is also a need to change the products of formal institutions by pursuing wider 
economic and social developments (Vanderseypen et al., 2013; Williams and 
Renooy, 2013, 2014). Until now, there have been three contrasting theoretical 
standpoints regarding what broader economic and social policies might en- 
courage citizens to pursue legitimate behavior and not to engage in work in 
the undeclared economy.  
 Firstly, the “modernization” thesis purports that the undeclared economy 
decreases as economies modernize and develop and therefore that economic 
development and growth is required to reduce the undeclared economy (ILO, 
2012). Secondly, the “neo-liberal” thesis argues that its prevalence is a direct 
result of high taxes, public sector corruption and state interference in the free 
market and therefore that tax reductions, resolving public sector corruption 
and reducing the regulatory burden are the ways forward (De Soto, 1989, 
2001; London and Hart, 2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Sauvy, 1984; Schneider and 
Williams, 2013). Third and finally, the “political economy” thesis argues that 
its pervasiveness is the outcome of inadequate levels of state intervention in 
work and welfare, meaning that workers are unprotected. The focus there- 
fore should be less upon formalizing work and more upon introducing social 
protection for workers, reducing inequality and pursuing labor market inter- 
ventions to help vulnerable groups (Castells and Portes, 1989; Davis, 2006; 
Gallin, 2001; Hudson, 2005; Sassen, 1996; Slavnic, 2010; Taiwo, 2013).   
 In recent years, there have been evaluations of which economic and social 
policies are associated with smaller undeclared economies (Vanderseypen et 
al., 2013; Williams, 2013a,b, 2014a,b,c; Williams and Renooy, 2013, 2014; 
Williams et al., 2013a). Analyzing the relationship between cross-national 
variations in the size of the undeclared economy and cross-national varia- 
tions in the various aspects of the broader economic and social environment 
deemed important by each of the above perspectives, there has been a rejec- 
tion of all of the tenets of the neo-liberal thesis. However, there is support 
for the tenets of both the modernization and political economy theses. The 
outcome has been a call for a new neo-modernization thesis. This argues that 
larger undeclared economies are associated with under-development and 
lower levels of taxation, expenditure on social protection and labor market 
intervention to protect vulnerable groups (Williams, 2013a.b, 2014a.b; Will- 
iams and Renooy, 2013, 2014).  
This more nuanced neo-modernization explanation for the cross-national 
variations in the size of undeclared economies has clear practical policy 
implications in terms of pinpointing the additional economic and social 
developments required. Wealthier economies, with stable high quality govern- 
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ment bureaucracies and those with lower poverty levels, more equality, 
greater levels of social protection, more effective redistribution via social 
transfers and greater state intervention in the labor market to protect vulner- 
able groups, have smaller undeclared economies.   
 
6. Synthesizing the Direct and Indirect Control Approaches 
 
The undeclared economy and low tax morality occurs when there is incon- 
gruity between the codified laws and regulations of formal institutions and 
the norms, values and beliefs that constitute informal institutions. To tackle 
the undeclared economy therefore, a reduction in this institutional incongruence 
is required. To achieve this, one can either change the formal institutions or 
one can change the norms, values and beliefs so that they better align with each 
other. These two options however, are not mutually exclusive. In practice, 
institutional incongruence and therefore poor tax morality and the existence of 
undeclared work, require that both change rather than one or the other.   
 Indeed, there has been growing recognition that the eliciting of internalized 
commitment to tax morality through indirect control measures that change 
formal and informal institutions, although necessary, is insufficient on its own 
as a means of engendering tax compliance (Williams, 2014a; Williams and 
Renooy, 2013). Instead, and given the multiple influences on the undeclared 
economy, a multi-pronged approach is required of which engendering inter- 
nalized commitment is one facet. For example, governments might seek to 
change the culture of government departments towards a more customer-
oriented approach and introduce public campaigns to elicit greater commit- 
ment to tax morality, whilst simplifying regulatory compliance and introduc- 
ing incentives (e.g., amnesties, tax deductions) to enable undeclared work to 
move into the declared realm. At the same time, and in relation to those who 
fail to comply, they may also pursue improvements in the probability of 
detection and tougher sanctions for those subsequently caught.  
The result is that there is recognition that both direct and indirect control 
measures need to be used together to tackle the undeclared economy. The 
current debate therefore, is not over whether to use direct or indirect con- 
trols. There is a consensus that both are required. Rather, the major problems 
involve working out which specific policy measures in each approach are 
most effective and what is the most effective way of putting these policy 
measures together in various combinations and sequences to engender com- 
pliance. At present for example, measures to improve detection through 
inspections are often combined with campaigns aimed at raising awareness 
or warning customers that inspections are about to occur. Tougher sanctions, 
moreover, follow amnesties and voluntary disclosure schemes. However, 
whether these combinations are more effective than other sequences and 
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combinations needs evaluating. In recent years nevertheless, two particular 
approaches have come to the fore in the literature that provide ways of 
combining these policy approaches in particular sequences, namely the re- 
sponsive regulation approach and the slippery slope framework.      
 
Responsive regulation 
Braithwaite (2002) distinguishes between “regulatory formalism” and “re- 
sponsive regulation.” The former is where an agency lists its problems in 
advance, specifies the appropriate response and generates manuals of rules to 
achieve these responses. This arguably enables process efficiency and outcome 
consistency. In recent years, and as discussed above, the nature of regulatory 
formalism has shifted away from reliance mostly on deterrents and towards 
the use of incentives to engage in declared work. There has also been a 
greater consideration of the fair and respectful treatment of taxpayers. Such 
“humanizing” of regulatory formalism however, is not the same as respon- 
sive regulation.  
Responsive regulation openly engages taxpayers to think about their 
obligations and accept responsibility for regulating themselves in a manner 
consistent with the law. It is about winning their “hearts and minds” so as to 
engender a culture of commitment to tax morality in order that people will 
regulate themselves rather than need to be regulated by external rules. How- 
ever, although it gives primacy to the use of indirect controls, it does not 
exclusively confine itself to such measures for engendering tax compliance. 
For Braithwaite (2009), responsive regulation means influencing the com- 
munity’s commitment to paying tax through respectful treatment, through 
attending to resistance and reforming faulty processes, through fairly directed 
and fully explained disapproval of non-compliant behavior, through prepared- 
ness to administer sanctions and to follow through to escalate regulatory 
intervention in the face of continuing non-compliance. Indeed, since responsive 
regulation was first proposed, it has enjoyed widespread support from both 
many scholars (Abbott and Snidal, 2013; Braithwaite, 2007, 2010; Dwenger 
et al., 2014; Grabosky, 2013; Hashimzade et al., 2013; Parker, 2013; Wood 
et al., 2010) as well as tax administrations (see Job et al., 2007).   
The Australian government for example has adopted this “responsive 
regulation” approach. As Figure 3 displays, in the first instance indirect con- 
trols facilitate voluntary self-regulated compliance, followed by persuasion 
and only then punitive measures to tackle tax non-compliance (Braithwaite, 
2009; Job et al., 2007). Put another way, this responsive regulation approach 
envisages a regulatory pyramid with various options that a tax authority can 
use to engender compliance, sequenced from the least intrusive at the bottom 
and used first to the most intrusive at the top.  
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The view is that a tax authority does not need in most cases to pursue the 
coercion option at the top of the pyramid to engender compliance. Instead, it 
can commence with the indirect control measures at the bottom of the pyramid 
and if these do not work with some groups, then the level of intrusiveness can 
escalate up the pyramid until it reaches the policy intervention that elicits the 
desired response. The outcome is recognition of a continuum of attitudes 
towards compliance and different policy responses that can be temporally se- 
quenced starting with commitment measures and moving through to sanctions.  
Whether this is the most appropriate combination and temporal sequencing 
of measures is open to debate. Until now, no evaluation has occurred of 
whether this sequencing of the policy measures used by the ATO is the most 
appropriate and/or effective sequencing combination to use to engender 
compliance. Neither has there been any testing of whether this particular 
sequential approach would also be the most appropriate to use elsewhere to 
tackle the undeclared economy. In other words, although it appears an appro- 
priate and effective way of tackling the undeclared economy, there is cur- 
rently no evidence-base of whether this is the case.   
 
Figure 3 The responsive regulation approach 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
                                     Attitude to   Compliance 
                          compliance       strategy  
 
Use full force of law 
Deter by 
detection 
Help to comply 
Make it easy 
Have decided not 
to comply 
Don’t want to 
comply 
Try to, but don’t 
always succeed 
Willing to do  
the right thing 
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Slippery slope framework 
Another way of combining the direct and indirect control approaches is by 
adopting the “slippery slope framework” (Kirchler et al., 2008) which has 
started to be widely discussed (Alm and Torgler, 2011; Alm et al., 2012; 
Kastlunger et al., 2013; Khurana and Diwan, 2014; Lisi, 2012; Muehlbacher 
et al., 2011a,b; Prinz et al., 2013). This distinguishes between two types of 
compliance, namely voluntary compliance and enforced compliance. Voluntary 
compliance occurs where there is trust in the authorities. Enforced compliance, 
meanwhile, occurs where authorities have power (i.e., the ability to get 
citizens to do what they were before not going to do, in the way in which the 
authorities wish them to do it). When there is neither trust in authorities and 
authorities do not have power, then undeclared work is rife.  
To tackle undeclared work, therefore, one can either increase the power of 
authorities and/or trust in the authorities. The direct controls approach tends 
to put the emphasis on increasing the power of authorities, whilst the indirect 
controls approach places greater emphasis on increasing the trust of author- 
ities. In practice, however, these are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to 
use both to engender compliance. The slippery slope framework displays that 
these choices are available as well as that both approaches can be combined 
in order to elicit behavior change. 
To evaluate the basic assumptions of the slippery slope framework, Wahl 
et al. (2010) randomly presented participants with one of four different 
descriptions of a fictitious country, in which the authorities were depicted as 
either trustworthy or untrustworthy on the one hand and as either powerful 
or powerless on the other hand. Their results show that participants paid 
significantly more taxes when both power and trust were high, as suggested 
by the slippery slope framework. They also found that voluntary compliance 
was highest when the authorities were both trustful and powerful, while en- 
forced compliance was highest when authorities were portrayed as powerful, 
but not trustworthy. This has been since further reinforced by two surveys of 
real-world taxpayers (Muehlbacher et al., 2011a,b). The outcome is that a 
combination of both greater trust in authorities and the greater power of 
authorities is seen as a potent combination in ensuring compliant behavior. 
Based on this, the suggestion is that it is not a matter of simply increasing 
trust or increasing the power of authorities. Rather, both in combination is 
argued to be the most effective approach.    
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper has been to provide a conceptual framework for under- 
standing the policy approaches for tackling undeclared work. Akin to many 
other contemporary societal problems, tackling the undeclared economy has 
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perhaps previously been conceptually framed as a “tame” problem (i.e., a 
problem that is complicated but easily solvable, often with a discrete response 
that can be replicated anywhere). Here however, the undeclared economy is 
reframed as a “wicked” problem which is complex, rather than complicated, 
and the outcome of a number of inter-related drivers, each of which if 
addressed has unforeseen and unintentional knock-on effects. Responsibility 
for tackling the problem moreover, stretches across multiple stakeholders 
and profound behavioral changes across both citizens and stakeholders are 
required to address the issue. Such wicked problems therefore, have to employ 
“clumsy” approaches rather than “elegant” solutions. 
Four hypothetical policy choices exist in relation to addressing undeclared 
work: do nothing; de-regulate the declared economy; eradicate the undeclared 
economy, or move undeclared work into the declared economy. Reviewing 
these choices, the first option of doing nothing is revealed to be unacceptable 
because it leaves intact the existing negative impacts on legitimate busi- 
nesses (e.g., unfair competition), undeclared businesses (e.g., the inability to 
gain access to credit to expand), customers (e.g., no guarantee that health and 
safety standards have been followed) and governments (e.g., taxes owed are 
not collected). Secondly, de-regulating the declared economy is unacceptable 
because it results in a leveling down rather than up of working conditions 
and third and finally, eradicating the undeclared economy is unacceptable 
because it leads to governments repressing through their approach towards 
the undeclared economy precisely the active citizenship, enterprise culture and 
social inclusion that they otherwise wish to nurture. Moving undeclared work 
into the declared economy thus appears to be the most viable policy choice.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the other choices are not useful. 
Although moving undeclared work into the declared economy is the most 
viable in terms of the overarching thrust of policy, it may be that doing 
nothing sometimes will have a supporting role to play such as in relation to 
small-scale paid favors because such activity is not susceptible to conversion 
into declared employment. A de-regulatory approach, meanwhile, may be in 
some instances useful when seeking to simplify compliance in relation to 
business start-ups, and an eradication approach when tackling those who fail 
to comply.   
To provide a conceptual framework of the policy measures available for 
tackling the undeclared economy therefore, the starting point and inspiration 
underpinning this paper has been the advances in eliciting behavior change 
at the organizational level amongst the workforce. Revealing how there has 
been a shift from the use of direct controls to indirect controls to elicit be- 
havior change at the organizational level, this paper has applied this approach 
at the societal level to tackling undeclared work. The result has been a call 
for a shift away from using solely direct controls (deterrents and incentives) 
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and for an exploration of the range of indirect controls that might also elicit 
behavior change.   
To develop this societal-level indirect controls approach towards tackling 
undeclared work, this paper has employed an institutional perspective. In many 
societies, there is incongruence between the laws, codes and regulations of 
the formal institutions and the norms, beliefs and values that comprise the 
informal institutions. The result is that what formal institutions deem illegit- 
imate are licit in terms of the norms, values and beliefs. To tackle undeclared 
work therefore, a reduction in this institutional incongruence is required. 
Two approaches exist for doing so.  
Firstly, one can change the norms, values and beliefs of the population 
regarding the acceptability of working in the undeclared economy so that these 
informal institutions align with the laws, regulations and codes of formal in- 
stitutions. This requires tax education initiatives, awareness raising campaigns 
and normative appeals that seek to improve the level of tax morality. Sec- 
ondly, one can change the formal institutions to align with the norms, values 
and beliefs of the wider society. On the one hand, this requires changes in 
the processes of formal institutions. This includes seeking improvement in 
procedural justice (i.e., whether citizens believe the authorities are treating 
them in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner), procedural fairness 
(i.e., whether citizens believe they are paying their fair share compared with 
others) and redistributive justice (i.e., whether citizens believe they are receiv- 
ing the goods and services they deserve given the taxes they pay). On the 
other hand, this requires changes in the products of formal institutions by 
pursuing wider economic and social developments. This includes the creation 
of wealthier economies, with stable high quality government bureaucracies 
that seek to reduce poverty levels, pursue equality, greater levels of social 
protection, more effective redistribution via social transfers and greater state 
intervention in the labor market to protect vulnerable groups. 
However, indirect control measures that change formal and informal insti- 
tutions, although necessary, are insufficient on their own to tackle undeclared 
work. Given that undeclared work is a wicked problem with multiple drivers, 
a multi-pronged approach is required that uses both direct and indirect controls. 
For example, governments might seek to change the culture of government 
departments towards a more customer-oriented approach and introduce public 
campaigns to elicit greater commitment to tax morality, whilst simplifying 
regulatory compliance and introducing incentives (e.g., amnesties, tax deduc- 
tions) to enable undeclared work to move into the declared realm. At the 
same time, and in relation to those who fail to comply, they may also pursue 
improvements in the probability of detection and tougher sanctions for those 
subsequently caught.  
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The debate therefore, is not so much over whether to use direct or indirect 
controls. Rather, the major discussion concerns which specific policy mea- 
sures are most effective and what is the most effective way of putting these 
policy measures together in various combinations and sequences to elicit 
behavior change. The “responsive regulation” approach and “slippery slope” 
framework provides two options. Whether these are more effective than other 
sequences and combinations now needs evaluation. If this paper therefore 
encourages greater research into which sequences and combinations are 
effective in which contexts, then it will have achieved its objective. If it also 
leads to the wider adoption of this conceptual framing for understanding the 
policy approaches for tackling undeclared work, then it will have achieved 
its wider intention.       
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